William Henry Wilson Hanna, Military Medal (c. 1929 – 27 July 1975), was a high-ranking Ulster loyalist who founded and led the Mid-Ulster Brigade of the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) until he was killed, allegedly by Robin Jackson, who took over command of the brigade.
Hanna had been awarded the Military Medal (MM) for gallantry while serving with the British Army's Royal Ulster Rifles in the Korean War. He then joined the Territorial Army and later the Ulster Special Constabulary (USC). When the latter was disbanded in 1970, he joined the newly formed Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR), a locally recruited infantry regiment of the British Army, as a part-time member. He held the rank of sergeant in C (Lurgan) Company, 11th Battalion UDR, and served as a permanent staff instructor (PSI).
According to Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) Special Patrol Group (RUC) officer John Weir, Hanna was a leader of one of the two UVF units that planned and carried out the Dublin car bombings on 17 May 1974, which killed 26 people. Former British soldier and psychological warfare operative Colin Wallace suggested that Hanna had been the principal organiser of the Dublin attacks. Journalist Joe Tiernan confirmed this and stated that he had also directed the Monaghan bombing which occurred that same evening and claimed an additional seven lives.
He began his military career in the British Army, serving in the Royal Ulster RiflesPotter p.90 where he held the rank of lance-corporal. He was awarded the Military Medal (MM) for gallantry during the Korean War.
After Hanna left the regular Army, he joined the North Irish Militia, Territorial Army unit (TA), and later the Ulster Special Constabulary (USC), commonly known as the B Specials, which was a reserve police force in Northern Ireland. Upon their disbandment in May 1970, he then became a part-time member of the newly formed Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR).
He was in 2 UDR's C (Lurgan) Company before it became C Company, 11th Battalion Ulster Defence Regiment (C Coy, 11 UDR), in 1972. He served as a permanent staff instructor (PSI), holding the rank of sergeant, although he was for a time weapons instructor at 2 UDR's base in Gough Barracks in Armagh. According to David McKittrick and UDR historian John Potter, Hanna was dismissed from the UDR after serving two years as a sergeant "for UVF activity"; however, authors Malcolm Sutton and Martin Dillon suggested he was still a member of the regiment at the time of his death. His brother Gordon served as a full-time member of the UDR.
Members of militant groups such as the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and Ulster Defence Association (UDA) managed to join the UDR despite the vetting process. Their purpose in doing so was to obtain weapons, training and intelligence. Vetting procedures were carried out jointly by British military intelligence and the RUC's Special Branch, and, if no intelligence was found to suggest unsuitability, individuals were passed for recruitment and would remain as soldiers until the commanding officer was provided with intelligence enabling him to remove soldiers with paramilitary links or sympathies. CAIN Archive:Public Records: Subversion in the UDR With his previous military experience and decoration for bravery, Hanna was just the type of recruit needed. He would have been fast tracked on a refresher course to sharpen up his military skills, and would have been part of the UDR's front line of experienced soldiers when the regiment began duties in 1970.Ryder p.40 In the regimental history of the UDR the author commented on men like him and (referring to another individual) suggested that, "he may have regarded himself as a true blue loyalist but had so little understanding of the meaning of loyalty that he would betray his regiment and his comrades....."Potter p.334
A member of the UVF's Brigade Staff (Belfast leadership) on the Shankill Road, Hanna was described by journalist Joe Tiernan as having been a "brilliant strategist and an able leader". Hanna's place on the Brigade Staff was remarkable in itself because, since the formation of the modern UVF by Gusty Spence, almost all of the UVF Brigade Staff members have been from the Shankill Road or the neighbouring Woodvale area to the west. Hanna, a native of Lurgan, was one of the few exceptions.Anderson, Malcolm & Bort, Eberhard (1999). The Irish Border: history, politics, culture. Liverpool University Press. p. 129. A Garda Síochána document dating from 1974 to 1975 revealed that the Republic of Ireland's police knew Hanna was the Officer Commanding (OC) of the Mid-Ulster Brigade's Lurgan unit. Tiernan alleged that Hanna personally recruited and trained young men from the Lurgan and Portadown areas who were "prepared to defend Ulster at any cost". Directed by Hanna, the brigade became the most lethal loyalist paramilitary group operating in mid-Ulster. He then began carrying out bank and post office robberies, and intimidated local businessmen into paying protection money to the Mid-Ulster UVF.
Hanna's Mid-Ulster unit was part of the group of loyalist extremists known as the Glenanne gang, comprising members of the RUC, UDR, UDA as well as the UVF, which carried out sectarian attacks in the 1970s in the area of south Armagh and mid-Ulster referred to as the "murder triangle". The gang was allegedly controlled by the RUC Special Branch and/or British Military Intelligence. The name is derived from a farm in Glenanne, County Armagh (owned by James Mitchell, an RUC reservist), "Collusion in the South Armagh/Mid-Ulster Area in the mid-1970s" which was used as a UVF arms dump and bomb-making site. According to the 2003 Barron Report, it was Hanna who had first obtained Mitchell's permission for the UVF to use his land to store weapons and assemble bombs.
In November 1973, Hanna was arrested after his home in Lurgan was searched by the RUC. He was charged with the possession of a round of ammunition and two six-volt batteries wired together which were found during the search. The Defence counsel described Hanna as a "former British Army soldier with a distinguished career in the Royal Ulster Rifles, having served in the Korean War".
Former British soldier and Troubles' writer Ken Wharton suggested in Wasted Years, Wasted Lives, Volume 1, his 2013 book, that the accusations against Hanna having been involved in loyalist paramilitary activities were unsubstantiated.Wharton, Ken (2013). Wasted Years, Wasted Lives, Volume 1. Solihull: Helion & Company. p. 106
The 1993 Yorkshire Television documentary, The Hidden Hand: The Forgotten Massacre also named Hanna as having been part of the Dublin bombing unit. The idea to bomb Dublin had been conceived and authorised by the UVF leadership, and the planning of the proposed car bombings took place in Belfast, Lurgan, and Portadown throughout the end of 1973 and early 1974. Hanna was allegedly put in charge of the operation and carefully chose the team of bombers who would assist him in the attacks. The men were all experts in their own field and drawn from the Mid-Ulster and Belfast brigades. Joe Tiernan claimed that Hanna appointed William Fulton as quartermaster for the bombings, but he did not indicate his source for the information. The Barron Report alleged that two months before the car bombings, instructions in making bombs were given by Hanna on Monday evenings, and that his name was on the Garda and RUC lists of suspects for the Dublin bombings. Houses of the Oireachtas, Joint Committee on Justice, Equality, Defence, and Women’s Rights, Interim Report on the Report of the Independent Commission of Inquiry into the Dublin and Monaghan Bombings (The Barron Report), December 2003, Appendices: The Hidden Hand: The Forgotten Massacre, p.28 retrieved 3 May 2011
It was stated in the Barron Report that former British soldier and psychological warfare operative Colin Wallace also suggested that Hanna had been the principal organiser of the Dublin car bombings. The attacks took place on the third day of the Ulster Workers' Council Strike. This was a general strike in Northern Ireland called by hard-line loyalists and unionists who opposed the Sunningdale Agreement and the Northern Ireland Assembly which had proposed their sharing political power with nationalists and planned a greater role for the Republic of Ireland in the governance of Northern Ireland. The UVF deliberately timed the bombings to coincide with the strike. At the time the bombings occurred, the UVF was legal; the proscription against the organisation had been lifted on 4 April 1974 by Merlyn Rees, Secretary of State for Northern Ireland in an effort to bring the UVF into the democratic process. It would once more be banned by the British Government on 3 October 1975.
In July 1993, a Garda detective received information from a reliable source that on 15 May 1974, a meeting had taken place inside the Portadown Golf Club in connection with the Ulster Workers' Council (UWC) strike; the same informer added that a separate meeting was held in the club which was attended by Hanna and Samuel Whitten, a suspect in the Monaghan bombing. Hanna and Whitten were both regular customers at the golf club and were often accompanied by RUC officers.
Tiernan said in his book, The Dublin Bombings and the Murder Triangle, that the Monaghan bombing, which took place 90 minutes after the Dublin explosions, was executed by loyalists working under the direction of Hanna. According to Tiernan, a few days before the bombing, Hanna had visited a pub in Portadown to check that everything was in place for the operation to be carried out. The Monaghan bombing had been organised as a diversionary tactic to draw Gardaí away from the border, enabling the bombers to cross back into Northern Ireland undetected. According to submissions received by Mr. Justice Barron, the Monaghan bomb was assembled at the home of high-ranking UVF member Harris Boyle in Portadown.On 31 July 1975, Boyle would be blown up when the bomb he and Wesley Somerville had loaded onto the Miami Showband's minibus exploded prematurely.
One former UVF man now in his seventies, who was a member of Billy's squad and whom Gardai named as having been involved in the Dublin bombings, told me during research for this book that Billy worked as a UVF agent for army intelligence officers in Lisburn. He said two middle-ranking officers in plain clothes travelled down from Lisburn once a fortnight in a van to meet Billy and give him instructions on what they wanted done. They would visit his house from time to time and they took him fishing to Banbridge. I saw them in his house a couple of times through the window as I approached but as no member of the unit was allowed to meet them I turned and went home and saw Billy later. But mostly they met him away from his house in carparks or the like. They would meet him in Portadown, Lurgan, Banbridge or out the country somewhere. Occasionally when our unit met to plan operations someone might ask Billy a question about some aspect of the operation. If Billy did not know the answer his reply would be: 'I'll have to take advice on that'. No one pushed the matter further but everyone knew Billy was talking about the army.
Former Military Intelligence officer Fred Holroyd claimed that Hanna had contact with a Field Intelligence Non-Commissioned Officer (FINCO) who reported to Holroyd. He wasn't certain whether his FINCO was working Hanna as an agent or seeking to gain his friendship in the hope of acquiring information.
Colin Wallace stated that he was told in 1974 that Hanna worked for British Army 3 Brigade.
With the devices armed and each boot laden with its lethal cargo, Hanna then gave the final instructions to the drivers of the three car bombs and they set off on their mission towards Dublin's crowded city centre. Two of the vehicles were escorted by "scout" cars for the bombers' escape back to Northern Ireland. Hanna and Jackson meanwhile left Dublin before 4.00 p.m. to return to the north, with the bombs at that point unexploded. Upon their return they went back to the soup kitchen they were running at a Mourneville bingo hall; the UWC strike was in its third day making it extremely difficult for people throughout Northern Ireland to obtain necessities such as food. Their absence had not been noticed by the other helpers. Tiernan later interviewed an elderly woman who described Hanna as the "head buck cat" of this food parcel service.. "Head buck cat" is a Northern Irish expression similar to "top dog"; meaning a leader, boss or somebody in control.
The car bombs detonated in Parnell Street, Talbot Street, and South Leinster Street, at 5.28 p.m., 5.30 p.m. and 5.32 p.m. respectively. No warnings had been given. According to military experts, the placement of the car bombs indicated "highly-intelligent military planning by people who knew what they were doing". One of the Irish Army's top bomb disposal officers, Commandant Patrick Trears, declared that the bombs were constructed so well that one hundred per cent of each bomb exploded upon detonation, Houses of the Oireachtas, Joint Committee on Justice, Equality, Defence and Women’s Rights, Interim Report on the Report of the Independent Commission of Inquiry into the Dublin and Monaghan Bombings (The Barron Report), December 2003, Appendices: The Hidden Hand: The Forgotten Massacre, p.22 resulting in the deaths of 26 people, mostly women (including one who was nine-months pregnant). Most of the dead were blasted beyond recognition; one girl who had been near the epicentre of the Talbot Street explosion was decapitated and only her platform boots provided a clue as to her sex. Houses of the Oireachtas, Joint Committee on Justice, Equality, Defence and Women's Rights, Interim Report on the Report of the Independent Commission of Inquiry into the Dublin and Monaghan Bombings (The Barron Report), December 2003, Appendices: The Hidden Hand: The Forgotten Massacre, p.5. Retrieved 7 October 2011 Close to 300 people were injured, many maimed for life. After the blasts the bombers fled from central Dublin in the scout cars and headed back north using the "smuggler's route" of minor and back roads, crossing the Northern Ireland border near Hackballscross, County Louth at about 7.30 p.m. Thirty minutes earlier, a fourth car bomb, delivered by a team from the Mid-Ulster UVF's Portadown unit, had exploded in Monaghan, killing an additional seven people. Samuel Whitten was allegedly the driver of the car. Houses of the Oireachtas, Joint Committee on Justice, Equality, Defence and Women’s Rights, Interim Report on the Report of the Independent Commission of Inquiry into the Dublin and Monaghan Bombings (The Barron Report), December 2003, Appendices: The Hidden Hand: The Forgotten Massacre, p.14
No one was ever convicted of the Dublin and Monaghan bombings. In the 1990s, journalist Peter Taylor questioned PUP politician and former senior Belfast UVF member David Ervine about UVF motives for attacking Dublin in 1974. Ervine replied that they UVF were "returning the serve". Although Ervine had had nothing to do with the bombings, he explained to Taylor that they had wanted Catholics across the Republic of Ireland border to suffer; this was in retaliation for the Protestant community in Northern Ireland, who had been victims of the Provisional IRA's intensive bombing campaign.
Mr Justice Henry Barron's opening statement to Oireachtas Joint Committee on 10 December 2003, described the Dublin and Monaghan bombings as the "most devastating attack on the civilian population of this State to have taken place since the 'Troubles' began". Houses of the Oireachtas, Joint Committee on Justice, Equality, Defence and Women’s Rights, Interim Report on the Report of the Independent Commission of Inquiry into the Dublin and Monaghan Bombings, December 2003, Appendix D, Mr. Justice Henry Barron's Statement to Oireachtas Joint Committee, 10 December 2003
For his part Hanna reacted to the bombings and his own role in them in a negative manner. According to a senior UVF figure in Armagh, who had not been involved in the bombings but who had played a leading role in a number of other operations by the Mid-Ulster Brigade, Hanna would frequently visit his house in the aftermath of the attacks and would cry about "all those children killed in Dublin".
On 28 May 1974, 11 days after the bombings, the UWC strike ended with the collapse of the Northern Ireland Assembly and the power-sharing Executive.
Joe Tiernan maintained that the man who shot and killed Hanna was Robin Jackson, who then assumed command of the Mid-Ulster UVF. Sean McPhilemy's The Committee: Political Assassination in Northern Ireland claims the Provisional IRA had initially been blamed for his killing. Hanna was allegedly shot after he had refused to participate in the UVF's planned Miami Showband attack, which Jackson had personally organised and would help to carry out on 31 July. Hanna's refusal stemmed from his purported remorse at the part he had played in the killing of "all those children in Dublin"; this was a reference to Hanna having instructed David Alexander Mulholland to park the first car bomb on Parnell Street, which killed two infant girls and eight other people when it detonated. By the time the Miami Showband ambush was in its planning stages, Hanna had already begun to distance himself from the UVF.
Dillon opined that Jackson's accomplice in the shooting was Harris Boyle, a 'major' in the UVF, who would be blown up in the Miami Showband attack four days later. Investigative journalist Paul Larkin, in his book A Very British Jihad: collusion, conspiracy, and cover-up in Northern Ireland, also said this, adding that Jackson shot Hanna after learning that he had passed on information regarding the Dublin and Monaghan bombings. Dillon suggested that because a number of UDR/UVF members were to be used for the Miami Showband ambush, Hanna was considered to have been a "security risk", and therefore had to be eliminated before he could alert the authorities. Dillon would later state that the killing had been carried out by Robin Jackson and Harris Boyle, with Jackson shooting Hanna in the head at point blank range before firing a second shot as Hanna lay on the ground. According to this account, Dillon maintained that Hanna's killing was purely a result of him having been labelled an informer.Martin Dillon (2003). The Trigger Men. Edinburgh: Mainstream Publishing. p. 25 David McKittrick in Lost Lives alleged that Jackson had killed Hanna to obtain a cache of weapons that Hanna held. Jackson reportedly later admitted that it had been "unfair to kill him."
Jackson attended Hanna's funeral on 29 July where he was photographed standing beside Wesley Somerville, the second bomber who would be killed in the Miami Showband attack. Following Hanna's killing, Mulholland and his family fled to England. The RUC eventually declared the killing unsolved and closed the file on the case. Hanna's widow frequently stated that she knew Jackson had been her husband's killer.McPhilemy, p. 416
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